DOI码：10.1007/s10479-023-05547-4

所属单位：华中科技大学

发表刊物：Annals of Operations Research

项目来源：国家自然科学基金面上项目（No.72071091）

关键字：Multi-stage trading; Asymmetric information ; Supply chain coordination; Game theory; Electricity markets

摘要：Climate change and the transition to renewable energy generation have led to unstable electricity supply and demand and soaring prices. In the power industry, spot market is crucial to balance fluctuating supply and demand, while future market can alleviate price fluctuations and coordinate supply chain. This paper compares two general market structures—spot market only versus future and spot market, so as to identify the optimal market structure from government's perspective. We also investigate power generators' market targeting strategy and contract choice: wholesale price contract or contract for difference. We find out that the future market can reduce both wholesale and retail prices, increase the amount of electricity, and improve supply chain profits and consumer surplus. To be specific, wholesale price contract is always beneficial for the retailer, but it can hurt generators' profits in a competitive future market. When spot trading is cost-effective for retailer and future market is less competitive for generators, contract for difference can make retailer worse off and generators better off. By revealing the effects of information structure (i.e., uncertainties of demand and supply cost, inaccuracy of the generators' signal) and forward contracts on supply chain performance, a regulation method for optimal allocation of renewable energy and non-renewable energy generation is proposed.

论文类型：期刊论文

学科门类：管理学

一级学科：管理科学与工程

文献类型：J

页面范围：1-45

字数：13916

ISSN号：0254-5330

是否译文：否

发表时间：2023-08-26

收录刊物：SCI

发布期刊链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05547-4