DOI码：10.25236/FSST.2019.010820

所属单位：Francis Academic Press

发表刊物：The Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology

刊物所在地：England

关键字：Split-award auction; Model

摘要：It is possible, in many purchase settings that a buyer can split a production award between suppliers. In this paper, I tried to introduce a split-award auction model with endogenous split choice. Then I discussed the equilibrium outcome of this model. By analyzing the properties of the equilibria and comparing the equilibria with a sole-source outcome, I arrived at the conclusions showing that the buyer would prefer a split-award auction to a winner-take-all auction because of the efficiency that a split-award auction can offer.

论文类型：期刊论文

学科门类：经济学

一级学科：应用经济学

文献类型：J

卷号：1

期号：8

页面范围：125-131

ISSN号：2616-7433

是否译文：否

发表时间：2019-01-08

发布期刊链接：https://francis-press.com/uploads/papers/ttDeH66w1xtZewuOKfzappQCEpZpLxWuPTz4YIGO.pdf