DOI number:10.25236/FSST.2019.010820

Affiliation of Author(s):Francis Academic Press

Journal:The Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology

Place of Publication:England

Key Words:Split-award auction; Model

Abstract:It is possible, in many purchase settings that a buyer can split a production award between suppliers. In this paper, I tried to introduce a split-award auction model with endogenous split choice. Then I discussed the equilibrium outcome of this model. By analyzing the properties of the equilibria and comparing the equilibria with a sole-source outcome, I arrived at the conclusions showing that the buyer would prefer a split-award auction to a winner-take-all auction because of the efficiency that a split-award auction can offer.

Indexed by:Journal paper

Discipline:Economics

First-Level Discipline:Applied Economics

Document Type:J

Volume:1

Issue:8

Page Number:125-131

ISSN No.:2616-7433

Translation or Not:no

Date of Publication:2019-01-08

Links to published journals:https://francis-press.com/uploads/papers/ttDeH66w1xtZewuOKfzappQCEpZpLxWuPTz4YIGO.pdf