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Lingchunzi Li

Name (Simplified Chinese):Lingchunzi Li
Name (English):Lingchunzi Li
Name (Pinyin):lilingchunzi
Gender:Female
Administrative Position:Lecturer
Professional Title:Lecturer
Status:Employed
Education Level:With Certificate of Graduation for Doctorate Study
Degree:Doctoral Degree in Management
Business Address:人文楼M520-2
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Alma Mater:Huazhong University of Science and Techonology
Teacher College:College of Economics & Management
School/Department:College of Economics and Management
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Paper Publications
Lingchunzi Li, Haijun Wang, Xin Yan*, Yiwen Bian. Forward contracting and spot trading in electricity markets
Release time:2023-08-26    Hits:

DOI number:10.1007/s10479-023-05547-4

Affiliation of Author(s):华中科技大学

Journal:Annals of Operations Research

Funded by:国家自然科学基金面上项目(No.72071091)

Key Words:Multi-stage trading; Asymmetric information ; Supply chain coordination; Game theory; Electricity markets

Abstract:Climate change and the transition to renewable energy generation have led to unstable electricity supply and demand and soaring prices. In the power industry, spot market is crucial to balance fluctuating supply and demand, while future market can alleviate price fluctuations and coordinate supply chain. This paper compares two general market structures—spot market only versus future and spot market, so as to identify the optimal market structure from government's perspective. We also investigate power generators' market targeting strategy and contract choice: wholesale price contract or contract for difference. We find out that the future market can reduce both wholesale and retail prices, increase the amount of electricity, and improve supply chain profits and consumer surplus. To be specific, wholesale price contract is always beneficial for the retailer, but it can hurt generators' profits in a competitive future market. When spot trading is cost-effective for retailer and future market is less competitive for generators, contract for difference can make retailer worse off and generators better off. By revealing the effects of information structure (i.e., uncertainties of demand and supply cost, inaccuracy of the generators' signal) and forward contracts on supply chain performance, a regulation method for optimal allocation of renewable energy and non-renewable energy generation is proposed.

Indexed by:Journal paper

Discipline:Management Science

First-Level Discipline:Management Science and Engineering

Document Type:J

Page Number:1-45

Number of Words:13916

ISSN No.:0254-5330

Translation or Not:no

Date of Publication:2023-08-26

Included Journals:SCI

Links to published journals:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05547-4